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THE REPRODUCTIVE BODY: 
EXPLORING REPRODUCTION BEYOND GENDER 
by 
 Ilyssa A. Silfen 
Advisor: Professor Matthew Brim 
 Most of us have been taught over the course of our lives that biological sex, gender, and 
reproduction are inescapably linked and, over time, this has created the illusion that these are all 
naturally connected.  However, these “natural” connections have been formed over time after 
generations of repetition.  While it may seem impossible to separate biological sex, gender, and 
reproduction from one another, it is important to deconstruct this falsely organic system from 
both a gender and human rights perspective. 
 This thesis seeks to explore the complex relationship between society’s reproductive 
mandate and the reality of the various processes of reproduction in relationship with gender.  
While society, on paper, simply demands that everyone reproduce, the truth is that society only 
wants a certain subset of people to do so—those who are heterosexual, cisgender, and behave in 
conventionally gendered ways.  This thesis further examines the gender and biological 
essentialism inherent in society’s reproductive mandate and explores this mandate in relationship 
with trans* reproduction, noting that there are certain standards to which trans* individuals are 
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Most of us have been taught over the course of our lives that biological sex, gender, and 
the various processes of reproduction are inexorably linked, soldered together in a seemingly 
organic manner, creating the illusion that all of these things are somehow naturally connected.  
We have been taught that biological male equals masculine, biological female equals feminine, 
that masculine men desire feminine women and vice versa, and that any alternatives to these 
combinations either do not exist or are somehow sinful and wrong.  This is connected to the 
belief that only men father children and only women give birth to them.  It may seem impossible 
to extricate biological sex, gender, and reproduction from one another, especially considering our 
socialization to believe that these connections are unutterably true, but it is very important to 
deconstruct this falsely organic system and prove that these seemingly “natural” connections are 
not very natural at all.  In a society where it is possible to change one’s legally recognized gender 
and to physically transition from one body to another—from male to female (M to F) and from 
female to male (F to M)—it is also entirely possible for a man to carry a pregnancy to term and 
give birth, and for a woman to father children.   
Pregnancy as a process—and reproduction as a whole—rev als the politics behind the 
way in which we choose to engage the relationships between biology (i.e. the body) and gender, 
specifically the ways in which we identify and classify physical characteristics in relation to our 
exposure to heteronormative social and cultural belief systems.  The processes of reproduction 
are strictly gendered, and as a result, these processes are treated as evidence of gender both in 
terms of physicality and ability.  Arguments abound concerning the issue of men giving birth and 
women fathering children, with many believing that if you choose to transition gender and 
nevertheless use the reproductive organs with which you were born (and therefore the organs 
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with which you are supposed to no longer identify) in order to produce children, you are not 
actually the gender with which you identify.  In other words, if you are transitioning from male 
to female for example, it is believed that you are not really a man if you choose to use your 
uterus to give birth to children, because the uterus has been characterized as a female organ.  In 
that vein, the various reproductive processes, as well as the figure of the child, act as both 
signifier and condition of legitimacy, as well as a privilege of that legitimacy.  In other words, 
the reproduction of children is believed to only be possible if you are a “real” (cisgender) man or 
woman, and the production of said children is a privilege of being proven to be a “real” 
(cisgender) man or woman.  The reproduction of children, as well as the ability to produce 
children, is considered significant proof of gender authenticity, whereas trans*1 individuals who 
produce children are considered as not truly being their identified status as a man or a woman 
since they are using their biological reproductive organs (e.g. the organs with which they are 
assumed to not identify in terms of their gender idntity) in order to produce children.  
Furthermore, the inability to reproduce as one’s self-id ntified gender is also used as a signifier 
of gender inauthenticity (e.g. if you are born biologically male but identify as female, the fact 
that you cannot gestate and give birth to a child wl count as evidence against your female 
identity).  Unlike cisgender individuals, for whom fertility—and the use of it—is proof of their 
gender authenticity, for trans* individuals, the only proof of their gender authenticity is total 
sterility.  It is in this way that one’s gender authenticity is inherently predicated on one’s 
reproductive capabilities (and vice versa).  
The physicality of gender is in direct relationship with its social nature, where our 
physical body has to align “properly” with our gendr identity in order for us to be perceived by 
                                                
1 The asterisk after the word “trans” is in place to include all non-cisgender gender identities and 
will be used throughout this paper. 
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society as authentic.  A critique exists in both the cisgender and LGBTQ communities that once 
you begin to identify as the gender opposite from the one you were assigned at birth (to borrow 
the terminology of the gender binary), you lose the privilege of reproducing children in the way 
that the gender of your birth would allow you to.  This is particularly indicative of how biology 
and its relationship with gender dictates what we perceive as normal when it comes to pregnancy 
and reproduction;  it also brings up the question of whether or not it is logical to place a gender 
on certain biological processes (such as reproduction) or on certain organs (the testes, the 
ovaries, the vagina, the penis, etc.).  In a society where we can legally change our sex, where we 
can transition from one body to another, thereby making it possible for men to give birth and for 
women to father children, is it feasible to continue to denote motherhood as belonging to women 
and fatherhood as belonging to men?  My conclusion i  that it is not, and as a result, I believe 
that we must take the gender out of reproduction altogether and focus on the functionality of our 
reproductive organs rather on their significance in our gendered identities, and we must 
acknowledge that people of many genders (not just male and female) exist, and that many of 
these people will choose to reproduce.  In other words, rather than focusing on reproductive 
organs and processes as sites of gendered meaning (e.g. ovaries and pregnancy = woman, testes 
and ejaculation = man), we could instead focus solely n their reproductive capacity.  If we 
chose to ungender reproduction, it is entirely probable that we would begin to discuss pregnancy 
as a pathway to fatherhood as well as motherhood—ejaculation as a pathway to motherhood as 
well as fatherhood.  Not only would the ungendering of reproduction create processes of 
reproduction without gender, but it could also possibly end the reproduction of gender.   
One of the ways that we could go about producing this c ange would be to expand our 
understanding of gender and its relationship to reproduction in terms of both 
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physicality/capability and their social construction, separating gender from body parts and 
acknowledging that neither biology nor gender are as strict as we would like to believe.  In 
talking about the physicality of gender, I am specifically talking about the biological 
characteristics and physical cues that we use in order to determine one’s sex (e.g. secondary sex 
characteristics), such as developed breasts, the pres nce or absence of body and/or facial hair, 
and/or the presence or absence of curves.  These phy ical cues are used as evidence of one’s 
biological sex, which in turn causes many people to assume one’s gender.  Each reproductive 
process (pregnancy and insemination) has a specific gender and biological sex attached to it due 
to repeated assertions about who does what in reproducti n.  In the example of Thomas Beatie, 
his pregnant body caused quite a stir in the general public and caused us to take a second look at 
what gender and biological sex have to do with pregnancy, as well as reproduction as a whole.  
While identifying as a man, and after having a double mastectomy and hormone treatments so 
that his physical body would match his gender identity, he used his biologically female 
reproductive organs in order to produce children.  His pregnancy, after it became public 
knowledge, quickly garnered mass publicity, much of it fierce condemnation.  The majority of 
this rejection had to do with our collective inability to recognize and accept a pregnant male 
body.  Our culture dictates that pregnancy is specifically a female process (read: belonging to cis 
women), so when we came face-to-face with a pregnant m , it forced us to ask ourselves, is 
pregnancy (and the pregnant body) truly inherently female?  In that same vein, is insemination 
(and the associated body) truly inherently male?  What do our conceptions of gender and 
biological sex in relation to reproduction say about r conceptions of gender and biological sex 
overall?  That we feel the need to ask these questions, and the answers that are often provided, 
proves that society is confused about its own reproductive mandate.  This mandate is inherently 
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flawed, and a tension exists between the basic demand th t the reproductive mandate makes of 
society’s members (“Everyone must reproduce”) and what the mandate is actually requiring.  
The reproductive mandate is clearly geared toward a specific subset of society, which is 
heterosexual couples consisting of one cisgender, conventionally masculine man and one 
cisgender, conventionally feminine woman.  Any reproductive act that occurs outside of that 
subset is considered abnormal and suspect despite the fact that, on paper, all society’s 
reproductive mandate demands is that people reproduce—there is no actual specification 
concerning who must do the reproducing.  The result of the continuous repetition of this specific 
type of reproduction being touted as the norm is confusion concerning to whom reproduction 
belongs, who has (and should have) the privilege of r producing, and the gendered implications 
of certain reproductive capabilities and processes.   
 
Gender and Biological Essentialism in Reproduction 
Gender essentialism is inherent in our perceptions of reproduction, so much so that even 
our gametes are assigned gendered behaviors.  Thereare two types of gametes – ovum, which 
are characterized as female, and sperm, which are ch ra terized as male.  We often forget that, 
despite their characterization as female and male, respectively, ovum and sperm have the same 
basic function—providing the genetic material necessary to produce a baby.  In her article "The 
Egg and the Sperm: How Science Has Constructed a Romance Based on Stereotypical Male-
Female Roles,” Emily Martin asks us to examine the ways in which the egg and the sperm are 
characterized, stating:  
Take the egg and the sperm. It is remarkable how "femininely" the egg behaves  
and how "masculinely" the sperm. The egg is seen as large and passive. It does  
not move or journey, but passively "is transported," "is swept," or even "drifts" 
along the fallopian tube. In utter contrast, sperm a e small, "streamlined," and  
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invariably active. They "deliver" their genes to the egg, "activate the  
developmental program of the egg," and have a "velocity" that is often remarked  
upon. Their tails are "strong" and efficiently powered. Together with the forces  
of ejaculation, they can "propel the semen into the de pest recesses of the  
vagina." For this they need "energy," "fuel," so that with a "whiplashlike  
motion and strong lurches" they can "burrow through the egg coat" and  
"penetrate" it (489).  
 
The eggs and sperm, despite having absolutely no cosciousness, and therefore no conscious 
motivation concerning their respective roles in reproduction, are given stereotypically feminine 
and masculine characteristics, with the feminine characteristics of passivity (and therefore the 
eggs) being portrayed as negative and the masculine characteristics of aggressiveness (and 
therefore the sperm) being portrayed as positive.  Martin goes on to note that "[i]n the case of 
women, the monthly cycle is described as being design d to produce eggs and prepare a suitable 
place for them to be fertilized and grown, all to the end of making babies.... By extolling the 
female cycle as a productive enterprise, menstruation must necessarily be viewed as a failure” 
(486).  This construction of menstruation as a failure rather than a natural biological process that 
has nothing to do with failure or success is indicative of the extent of the social construction of 
motherhood as a necessity for all women, and characterizes women’s monthly menstruation as a 
sign/reminder that they have failed in the ultimate womanly endeavor.  It is quite interesting to 
note that this is not coming from a purely sociological/cultural standpoint, but rather from a 
scientific/biological standpoint with sociological/cultural undertones attached to it.  The 
characterization of menstruation as a failure of the woman to produce a child perpetuates the idea 
that women's biological capacity to reproduce should a tomatically translate into a 
compulsory/required act.  Adrienne Rich makes the observation that 
None of the “experts’” advice has been either particularly scientific or women- 
oriented;  it has reflected male needs, male fantasies about women, and male  




Here, Rich examines the institution of motherhood, and the way that it is medicalized and 
(re)defined by men, as another means of women’s oppression.  It is surely no coincidence or 
mistake that motherhood has become compulsory and that motherhood and womanhood are so 
intricately linked.  Femininity is linked so intrinsically with the institution of motherhood due to 
the perceived inherent characteristics of nurturing instinct, emotional availability, and passivity, 
all of which are believed to make one a good mother, as well as a good woman. 
When looking at gender, specifically at masculinity and femininity and what each means 
to us, we often look to the abstract concepts of behavioral patterns.  In our society, aggression 
and competitiveness are considered to be masculine whil passivity and nurturing are considered 
to be feminine.  However, much of our understanding of ender also comes from the physicality 
of it—there are certain bodily characteristics that we read as either masculine or feminine.  For 
example, most people would associate a more muscular body with masculinity, as opposed to a 
softer body, which would be associated with femininity.  When the conceptualization of 
pregnancy enters the picture, this concept of the physicality of gender is particularly important to 
note, especially concerning how it relates to our notions of gender (specifically femininity).  In 
her study “The Gender of Pregnancy: Masculine Lesbians Talk about Reproduction,” Maura 
Ryan notes that “[h]eterosexism and patriarchy collude to create an expectation of pregnancy for 
all women.  In addition, the bodily production of pregnancy has been socially gendered as 
feminine because of its association with female-bodied people” (119).  In other words, the 
repetitive nature of female-bodied persons going through the biological process of pregnancy and 
childbirth has created the assumption that pregnancy belongs only to female-bodied persons 
(read: cisgender women).  Ryan decided to interview only childfree lesbians for this study 
because of her observation that the “two ideological codes—that all women should become 
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mothers through pregnancy and that pregnancy is a femininely gendered endeavor—suggest a 
conundrum for masculine lesbians” (119).  When she conducted these interviews, she found that 
“all participants agreed that feminine pregnancy is a cultural construction.  Still [in the context of 
why they chose to avoid pregnancy], they talked about [the theoretical condition of] being 
pregnant as becoming, feeling, and being perceived as more feminine than one might have been 
before pregnancy” (Ryan 125).  While pregnancy is perceived as a cultural construction, there is 
still an association with typical femininity and with being perceived as feminine, even though 
pregnancy as a biological process is neither masculine nor feminine.  In fact, “many of [the 
participants’] comments illustrated a distinctly ess ntialist understanding of pregnancy 
necessitating femininity.  For instance, all participants noted that pregnancy introduces bodily 
changes that highlight biological femaleness, which is conflated with femininity” (Ryan 125).  
The curvy, non-pregnant body in and of itself is perceived as feminine, whether that body is 
perceived as male or female;  however, pregnancy brings on bodily changes like enlarged 
breasts, wider hips, and a protruding stomach, which are believed to amplify one’s femininity 
and make it even more obvious.  Pregnancy, and the physical changes that come with it, 
amplifies the attributes that we read as feminine ad makes more obvious what specific bodily 
characteristics we look for in order to read someone as female.  Ryan noted that for those 
participants whose masculinity is contingent on their bodily appearance, even though they 
already “currently have female bodies they expressed concern that they could have more of a 
female body than they do now” (125).  This brings to mind an interesting concept of the 
physical, gendered body as existing on a continuum or spectrum.  If it is true that one’s physical 
portrayal of gender (in other words, the gender they choose to present with their bodies) is 
contingent on physical characteristics such as body an /or facial hair, the possession of a 
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muscular or curvy body, and wearing one’s hair short or long, then it makes sense that the 
reproductive process of pregnancy—and the changes that they would experience—would have 
high stakes for someone who identifies as masculine and/or male.  In that vein, it is easy to 
understand how and why pregnancy is treated as proof of cis women’s femininity and 
femaleness.  When a woman becomes pregnant, not only is her abstract femininity confirmed, 
but her physical “femaleness” is confirmed as well.  In another study titled “Reproductive Wish 
in Transsexual Men,” eleven out of the fifty trans* men who participated in the study had 
children, and “three of the participants gave birth themselves before hormonal therapy and SRS.  
Two of those three participants who gave birth thems lves experienced this as (very) 
problematic, while one participant found this experience very pleasant” (Wierckx et al. 485).  It 
is not indicated why the two participants found the c ildbirth experience problematic, but based 
upon my other research, it is reasonable to assume that they felt their gender identity clashed 
with the biological process of pregnancy and childbirth, which has been categorized as 
essentially female and involves “female” body parts in order to complete.  In order to eliminate 
the concept of pregnancy as being a specifically feminine and/or female process, we would need 
to go even deeper and eliminate the concept of gender d bodily characteristics, which is no easy 
task! 
In our society, we define bodies as male and female.  If we were to ask ourselves as a 
society exactly how we would go about defining these bodies, we would likely argue that we do 
so by looking at reproductive organs and secondary sexual characteristics.  Going beyond that, 
we might even argue that chromosomes are the deciding factor in determining gender.  For 
example, if somebody has two X chromosomes, they “must” be female, no matter what their 
external appearance and no matter what surgeries they may have had.  However, in all of these 
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delineations of male and female, we forget the roleof culture in constituting male and female as 
categories that supposedly have unambiguous biological referents.  Biology itself certainly did 
not decide that two X chromosomes denote a female and that one X and one Y chromosome 
denote a male.  Is there something inherent in the X chromosome that makes it female and in the 
Y chromosome that makes it male?  Judith Butler argues in her book Undoing Gender that, in 
our society, how “the genetic presence of the ‘Y’ works in tacit ways to structure feeling and 
self-understanding as a sexed person is the basis [for evidence of one’s male gender]” (64).  
Even though the Y chromosome in and of itself is not necessarily inherently male, we have been 
socialized to believe that its very presence in a person’s body indicates that the person is male.  
In that same vein, is there something inherent in the uterus/ovaries/vagina that makes them 
female and in the testicles/penis that make them male?  There is absolutely no actual biological 
evidence that there is a specific gender tied to any of these chromosomes and organs, except for 
the evidence that people decided exists.  There is no reason that we cannot expand our 
conceptions of pregnancy to include men and inseminatio  to include women, nor is there any 
reason why we cannot talk about the male uterus, male ovaries, or a male vagina, as well as 
female testes and a female penis.  There is nothing about any of these things that we can pinpoint 
as being specifically masculine or feminine, and therefore as belonging to only men or women.  
After all, biology is not nearly as strict as many people would like to think it is.  For example, 
most of us learned in school that the male of the seahorse species carries and gives birth to their 
young.  Even human biology is pretty lax—biology produces human beings that reside outside 
the boundaries of the gender binary all the time.  I cite the example of gynecomastia, which is 
defined as “swelling of the breast tissue in boys or men, caused by an imbalance of the hormones 
estrogen and testosterone” (Mayo Clinic).  The definition itself reveals a gender binary bias, in 
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that the swelling of the breast tissue is defined as a medical problem and as being the result of a 
hormonal imbalance.  The only reason it is being described as such is because our culture 
dictates that men must have a certain level of hormones (more testosterone than estrogen) and a 
certain type of body (muscular, angular)—therefore, it is no surprise in that context that a boy or 
a man would be described as having “too much” estrogen and “too little” testosterone, resulting 
in the development of breasts, which are a specifically “female” body part.   
Biology also produces intersex individuals, whom Judith Butler defines as having 
“sexually indeterminate or hermaphroditic anatomy” (4).  In our society, we treat intersex 
individuals as abnormalities who require surgery in order to fix them when, in reality, there is 
nothing wrong with intersex individuals at all.  AsButler notes, we need to come to “an 
understanding that [people] with intersexed conditions are part of the continuum of human 
morphology” (4).  In other words, rather than viewing intersex individuals as being abnormal, we 
need to expand our collective vision of gender and make it more comprehensive;  we do not exist 
in a binary, but a spectrum, and intersex individuals are simply another part of that spectrum.  
There are also chromosomal variations such as Triple X Syndrome, where a female-bodied 
person carries an extra X-chromosome (Mayo Clinic), Klinefelter syndrome, where a male-
bodied person carries an extra X-chromosome (Mayo Clinic), XYY syndrome, where a male-
bodied person carries an extra Y-chromosome (Holland), and Turner Syndrome, where a female-
bodied person is missing an X chromosome or carries on  that is incomplete (The University of 
Utah).  We characterize these biological characteristics as “abnormal” as a direct result of our 
socialization into the sex and gender binaries, not because there is anything actually biologically 
wrong, per se (there are cases where these chromosomal c nditions can result in moderate to 
severe negative health effects, but most people live very ordinary and healthy lives), but because 
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we fail to conceptualize the possibility that they are simply natural variations of sex and gender.  
Just because someone has a chromosomal makeup that is not XX or XY does not mean that they 
are inherently abnormal or flawed, and it is crucial for us to begin to conceptualize a gender 
spectrum, rather than a binary, in order to be more inclusive of those whose bodies and genders 
do not necessarily fit into the artificial gender binary.  As Butler argues, we need to “question 
why society maintains the ideal of gender dimorphism when a significant percentage of [people] 
are chromosomally various” (65) and recognize that “a continuum exists between male and 
female that suggests the arbitrariness and falsity of he gender dimorphism as a prerequisite of 
human development” (65).  This is particularly important for trans* men with working “female” 
reproductive systems and trans* women with working “male” reproductive systems—especially 
those who have chosen to use them to produce biologica  children—in that it is more inclusive 
and acknowledges that some men will, in fact, give birth, and some women will father children. 
 Physicality is not the only factor in how we interpret gender identities and integrate them 
into our understanding of the world.  There are social factors as well, such as family ties, which 
allow the general population to translate gender difference into something that they can 
understand more clearly.  Both the physicality and the social aspect of gender are represented a 
great deal in Landau’s article “Reproducing and Transgressing Masculinity.”  The article is a 
write-up of a study that Landau did in which she showed two digital photographs of a heavily 
pregnant Thomas Beatie (a transgender man who kept his biologically female reproductive 
organs in order to be able to bear children, choosing to do so because his then-wife was infertile) 
to a group of American women of childbearing age and recorded their ideological, emotional, 
and physical interactions with the photographs (178).  The first picture portrayed Beatie by 
himself, one hand behind his head and the other holding his pregnant belly.  Landau notes that 
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the women “more often than not…focused on specific v sual codes that they interpreted as 
‘masculine’ or ‘manly,’ such as facial and armpit hair and ‘no breasts.’  Then they focused on 
how the ‘stomach’ or ‘belly’ stuck out because it was a ‘beer belly’ or a disease of some sort” 
(186).  The women in this study react to this image in a very interesting way—the visual of 
Beatie’s pregnant belly, something that has been traditionally characterized as female, 
emphasizes his masculine traits all the more.  Rather than focusing on his pregnant belly, most of 
the participants noted his masculine/“manly” traits nd then tried to explain his pregnant belly 
after the fact.  In the second picture, Beatie is portrayed with his wife Nancy, who has her head 
on his chest and is cradling his pregnant belly.  Landau notes that “the majority of the women 
interacted with Figure 2 in some ways that were similar to their interaction with Figure 1, such as 
how they ideologically decoded traditional visual symbols of facial hair as meaning a ‘man.’  
Overall, the women ‘made sense’ of a ‘pregnant (transgender) man’ and a ‘happy family’ 
instead” (190).  In their reactions and interactions with the second photograph, rather than 
reproducing the figure of a pregnant man, they specifically reproduced the figure of a pregnant 
transgender man, asking questions about the symbolism of transgender and commenting and 
questioning the scientific and medical possibilities therein (Landau 191).  In other words, in 
order to understand Beatie’s pregnancy, rather than re ding Beatie as a man, the women had to 
specifically read Beatie as a trans* man—they had to read him as someone who had previously 
been female-bodied at some point in his life.  This in and of itself is progress, according to 
Landau, who argues that  
for the most part [today’s women of child-bearing age] no longer make meaning  
of pregnancy as traditionally female or feminine and disassociated from  
masculine men, since “a pregnant (transgender) man” w s reproduced.  I suggest  
that this is hopeful for challenging gender and biological essentialisms related to  
human reproduction because it is an alternative to the norm…Even more  
progressive is the fairly positive feelings and ideological interpretation of the  
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visual symbol of a pregnant man who was “transgender,” since just the use of that  
terminology promotes nonbinary gender and sexuality. (Landau 192-3) 
 
Despite reading Beatie as male, not only were the women in the study able to conceptualize the 
idea of a pregnant transgender man, they were also able to react to it positively.  Beatie’s 
existence as a pregnant transgender man in and of itself indicates that the reproduced 
sociological norms relating to the relationship between biological reproductive capacity, gender 
identity, and sexuality can be (and are being) transgressed.  Landau states that “[i]t is plausible 
that the protruding (pregnant) belly comically revealed, at least to some of the women of child-
bearing age, the distinction between the anatomy of men and the performance of gender, a 
contingent relation that is all too often and errone usly assumed to be natural” (188).  For the 
women participating in the study, Beatie’s pregnant belly does not only emphasize his masculine 
traits, but it also reveals the performativity of gender vs. the socio-cultural dictates of biology.    
 Gender essentialism has played a large role in the gen ral public’s reaction to Thomas 
Beatie’s pregnancy, including his pregnant body and how that body was interpreted within the 
context of our society’s conceptions of biological sex and the related reproductive processes and 
capacities.  As a society, we expect certain bodies of certain biological make-up and gender 
representation to reproduce in specific biological and gendered ways.  Beatie pushes against the 
norms of heteronormative cisgender reproduction in that he uses a visually male body in a 
conventionally “female” manner for the purposes of reproduction and refuses to see himself as 
any less of a man because of it.  I return to Jamie Landau’s study in the next chapter to explore 
the societal and cultural implications of the gender essentialism inherent in our reactions to 




Connecting Biology, Normative Gender Roles, and Reproduction 
In order to analyze the role of normative gender roles in reproduction (and vice versa), 
we must look at Darwin’s work.  In her book Evolution’s Rainbow: Diversity, Gender, and 
Sexuality in Nature and People, in a chapter titled “The Theory of Evolution,” Joan 
Roughgarden discusses Darwin’s theory of evolution and sexual selection and how he applied a 
deeply sexist and heteronormative social hierarchy and structure to the biological processes of 
the natural world.  She notes that 
Darwin pejoratively viewed diversity within a specis as a hierarchy beginning  
with superior individuals and winding down do the “r tarded,” a view that is  
diversity-repressing and elitist, stressing a weeding out of the weak and sickly and  
naturalizing male domination of females....The contradiction evident in Darwin’s  
attitude to diversity within species…plagues our society today, from biology and  
medicine to politics and law. (Roughgarden 165) 
In other words, even though Darwin published his theory long ago, the contents of his theory 
have had far-reaching implications in practically a aspects of our society.  We continue to 
believe that men are hard-wired to be sexually aggressive and that women are hard-wired to 
accept it.  In relation to this, Roughgarden discuses a then-recent publication of a theory of the 
naturalness of rape, where the argument is made that “men unable to find mates in the ‘usual 
way’ can reproduce through rape.  Genes for rape then increase, leading to the brain’s acquisition 
of a ‘rape chip.’  All men are therefore potential r pists, although they do not necessarily act on 
this potential, depending on external circumstances” (173).  Another example of the defense of 
male sexual aggressiveness as “natural” can be found in the article “Why Do Men Rape? An 
Evolutionary Psychology Perspective” by William F. McKibbin, Todd K. Shackelford, Aaron T. 
Goetz, and Valerie G. Starratt, which argues 
For rape to be produced by evolved psychological mechanisms, it must have  
recurrently generated reproductive benefits for ancestral rapists.  These benefits  
must have outweighed the costs that men may incur if they attempt or  
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successfully complete a rape.   Despite the costs, there is evidence that rape may  
have increased the number of women with whom ancestral men copulated and,  
therefore, the reproductive success of rapist males. (McKibbin et al. 88)  
  
In this argument, the authors state that rape is anevolved behavior, i.e., an improved behavior 
from our ancestors.  Not only are the authors arguing that rape is an evolved behavior, they are 
also arguing that there are reproductive benefits to rape, and therefore making the argument that 
rape is evolutionarily beneficial.  These are just a few examples of the many societal 
repercussions of Darwin’s work that Roughgarden discus es in her chapter: 
Today’s [sexual selection] theory makes matters worse by adding new mistakes, 
morphing what Darwin actually wrote into a caricature of male hubris.  According to 
today’s version, males are supposed to be more promiscuous than females because sperm 
are cheap, and hence males are continually roaming around looking for females to 
fertilize. Conversely, females are supposed to be choosy because their eggs are 
expensive, and hence they must guard their investment from being diluted with bad genes 
from an inferior male.  A male is naturally entitled to overpower a female’s reluctance 
lest reproduction cease, extinguishing the species. (167-8) 
 
Darwin’s theory of sexual selection is rooted in heterosexism and has resulted in what can only 
be called a biological defense not only of a sex and gender binary, but also of male sexual 
aggression and rape.  As Roughgarden notes, “Sexual selection theory has long been used to 
perpetuate ethically dubious gender stereotypes that demean women and anyone else who 
doesn’t identify as a gender-normative heterosexual male” (172).  Lesbians in particular, in a 
society that is both deeply homophobic and sexist, face a unique sort of hostility;  they face 
derision not only because they are women who love women but also because, due to the fact that 
they only love other women, men are removed from the equation entirely.  They face a unique 
spectrum of violence, ranging from minimization and being made invisible within society and 
within their own families, to physical acts of violence such as murder and “corrective” rape.  The 
concept of corrective rape stems from the idea that women are only supposed to be sexually 
attracted to men, the result of which is the belief that all lesbians need is a good man to remind 
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them of their place.  This physical act of extreme violence stems from the socially constructed 
and unbending connection between biological sex and sexuality and extends into the connection 
between gender and reproduction.  While this connection is made out to be a natural, organic 
connection, it is in reality a compulsory act, an act driven by social pressure and repetition, 
creating the illusion that this connection is normal. 
As Wittig argues in her critically important essay “One is Not Born a Woman,” women 
are only women due to their social and political relationships with men—she states that “Once 
the class ‘men’ disappears, ‘women’ as a class will disappear as well, for there are no slaves 
without masters” (106).  If women love women, they exclude men from their primary romantic, 
emotional, and sexual lives, and they do not fulfill their socially constructed roles within 
heterosexual relationships, heterosexual marriage, nd reproduction, the latter of which is more 
often than not a compulsory act.  In that vein, Wittig acknowledges that women who control their 
reproduction will also have to reject the label “woman,” stating that “gaining control of the 
production of children will mean much more than the m re control of the material means of this 
production:  women will have to abstract themselves from the definition ‘woman’ which is 
imposed upon them” (104).  Our society conflates womanhood and motherhood to an excessive 
degree, essentializing the biological capabilities of pregnancy and childbirth as well as the 
supposedly natural and innate ability of childcare s the ultimate signifiers of woman-ness.  
Therefore, it is not that far-fetched to argue thatwomen who reject motherhood could also be 
considered “not women” and that motherhood in and of itself is a socially constructed identity, 
one that, to borrow and paraphrase Judith Butler’s argument concerning the performance of 
gender, relies on repetition, performativity, and compulsion in order to be continually reproduced 
as a natural given.  Those of us who reject motherhood as an inevitability are often characterized 
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as unnatural, further perpetuating the belief that womanmother is the natural cycle of things 
and any other choice is, by definition, unnatural.  In other words, to question motherhood is to 
question womanhood, and by refusing to engage in the institution of motherhood, by refusing to 
acknowledge motherhood as an unavoidable life course, we remove ourselves from a system that 
defines us by our biologically determined reproductive and sociologically constructed nurturing 
capabilities.   
As Wittig states, “instead of seeing giving birth as a forced production, we see it as a 
‘natural,’ ‘biological’ process, forgetting that inour societies births are planned (demography), 
forgetting that we ourselves are programmed to produce children, while this is the only social 
activity ‘short of war’ that presents such a danger of death” (104).  When we provide young girls 
with dolls, meant to prepare them for inevitable motherhood, we are preparing them through play 
for a role that is supposedly naturally innate and biologically inevitable, and we fail to address 
the very real physical, emotional, and mental risks nvolved with pregnancy and childbirth, as 
well as the emotional and mental stressors involved with childcare.  Adrienne Rich, in her essay 
“Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence,” agrees with Wittig, wondering why 
“species survival, the means of impregnation, and emotional/erotic relationships should ever 
have become so rigidly identified with each other;  and why such violent strictures should be 
found necessary to enforce women’s total emotional, erotic loyalty and subservience to men” 
(232).  Rich argues here that women’s capability of pr ducing offspring has, over time, become 
an obligation due to the strict gender hierarchy that states men’s desires are worth more than 
women’s physical and sexual autonomy.  This is evident in that men’s bodies and sex lives are 
not regulated to the same level as women’s bodies, if at all.  There has yet to be a legislative bill 
passed that restricts men’s access to Viagra and vasectomies, or forces unwanted medical 
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procedures on them in order for them to access these t ings.  Women are not allowed autonomy 
over their bodies simply due to the fact that they ave the capability of producing children, and 
our legal system is continually trying to implement policies that make sure this disallowance 
sticks—these same systems make it close to impossible for women to prevent pregnancies and 
terminate the pregnancies that result from the lackof access to birth control methods.  For a 
society and a legal system that believe that all women are naturally wired for motherhood, they 
certainly have to do a lot of work to make sure that women do not opt out!  In that regard, what 
are women who cannot reproduce or, like myself, have chosen not to reproduce?  Are we not-
women?  Half-women?  How about women who are just beginning or ending their periods, such 
as those going through menarche or menopause?  How ab ut trans* men, who have decided to 
produce children using their biologically female reproductive organs in order to do so?  These 
questions alone illustrate the illogical nature of de ining human beings as only two biological 
sexes, and they also demonstrate an inherently violent ideology that is aimed at women who do 
not, will not, and/or cannot reproduce.   
It is for these reasons that I take serious issue with the way in which society promotes a 
natural link between being biologically female, and therefore feminine, and therefore naturally 
nurturing and maternal and desiring of pregnancy.  In other words, according to today’s social 
norms, women by their very nature have an unshakeable desire to bear children.  This link has 
caused pregnancy and birth to become a compulsory act ather than a choice, and one could 
argue that pregnancy and birth were never a choice f r women in the first place.  For many 
people, women are defined by their ability to reproduce;  in fact, this very rhetoric concerning 
reproductive capability was used to discredit Thomas Beatie’s gender identity.  Many people in 
both the straight and LGBTQ communities argued that he was not really a man because he had 
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decided to keep his ovaries, uterus and vagina, and because he had made the decision to perform 
a decidedly female act:  giving birth.  Many cisgend r women criticized him for taking away the 
one thing that makes women worthwhile, or at least the one thing that only women can do, and 
this alone is evidence of how society’s outdated an hostile connections between biological sex, 
gender, and reproduction have become the norm.  The ve ment censure of Beatie’s decision to 
birth his own children has had far-reaching implications outside of his reproductive capabilities 
and choices.  For example, in March 2013, Beatie decided to divorce from his wife, but the judge 
refused to grant the divorce, stating that “he had no jurisdiction to approve a divorce because 
there's insufficient evidence that Beatie was a manwhen he married Nancy Beatie in Hawaii. He 
said the Beaties never provided records to fully explain what Thomas Beatie actually had done 
and not done to become a man” (Davenport and Fonseca).  In other words, the judge refused to 
grant them a divorce because, due to Beatie’s apparently ambiguous legal gender status, it was 
not entirely clear whether or not he and Nancy were l gally married—the issue being that same-
sex marriage is illegal in Arizona, and therefore, if Beatie was still legally a woman at the time of 
the marriage, the marriage would be considered invalid.  The general consensus is that the legal, 
federal definition of gender includes whatever is present on your birth certificate.  In that case, 
since Beatie was granted a new birth certificate in Hawaii before the marriage (Davenport and 
Fonseca), the marriage would indeed be valid and therefore eligible for a divorce.  What is 
particularly interesting is the way in which the judge refers to Beatie’s gender as something that 
he “became,” and which included certain steps that he would have to take in order to be 
considered a man.  As Butler notes, “to go from F to M, or from M to F, is not necessarily to stay 
within the binary frame of gender, but to engage transformation itself as the meaning of 
gender…becoming is the vehicle for gender itself” (65).  The judge’s response to Beatie’s gender 
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identity reflects this avenue of thought.  However, it is clear that, for the judge, the 
aforementioned list of steps to “become” a man included the removal of Beatie’s ovaries and 
uterus, as well as his cessation of the use of those reproductive organs, as noted by the judge’s 
comment that “he was unable to find legal authority defining a man as someone who can give 
birth” (Davenport and Fonseca).  The reason for this is likely that one’s reproductive capacity is 
not referenced in any legal definition of “man” or “woman,” which is also quite interesting to 
note.  If one’s reproductive capacity were a factor in the legal definition of gender, then anyone 
who is infertile would, legally speaking, not be considered a man or a woman.   
 Gender essentialism is inherent in our analysis of, and reactions to, trans* men’s 
pregnancies.  In the article “Reproducing and Transgressing Masculinity: A Rhetorical Analysis 
of Women Interacting with Digital Photographs of Thomas Beatie,” which I referenced earlier in 
this paper, Jamie Landau notes that many cis-women’s r actions to male pregnancy have been 
negative, arguing a belief that trans* men are attemp ing to appropriate pregnancy, which is a 
specifically “female” domain (182).  She notes that “scholars predominantly argue that verbal 
and visual representations of male pregnancy generally symbolize male takeover of human 
reproduction at the expense of erasing reproducing women” (Landau 183).  It is interesting to 
explore why, in feminist scholarship and general discourse surrounding pregnancy where cis-
women have been fighting to be viewed as more than just baby-machines, cis-women would 
react this way to the ungendering of pregnancy through the lens of the trans* male body.  The 
majority of the argument surrounding reproductive rights is that women are more than just 
walking uteri, and yet when faced with the possibility of male pregnancy, despite not wanting to 
be known by our biological reproductive capacity alone, we revert back to the argument that 
pregnancy is a woman’s domain.  This idea of trans* men appropriating pregnancy and 
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invisibilizing pregnant cis women is similar to the transphobic rhetoric of many rad-fem (radical 
feminist) groups who argue that trans* women are merely men in drag infiltrating women-only 
spaces.  Likewise, pregnant trans* men are seen as infiltrating the women-only space of 
pregnancy and childbirth, and as a result, male pregnancy is treated as a threat to women’s 
reproductive capacity.  However, this interpretation of male pregnancy is inherently flawed.  
When Thomas Beatie first went public with his pregnancy, women’s pregnant bodies were not 
instantly erased from the picture as originally feared.  In fact, the complete opposite happened—
the majority of public commentary continued to vehemently argue pregnancy to be a woman’s 
domain.  The interpretation of trans* male pregnancy as threatening to the “natural order” of 
female-bodied pregnancy is interesting in that it requires Thomas Beatie, as well as all trans* 
men,  to be read as male in order to work.  Landau arg es that, rather than erasing women’s 
pregnant bodies, “a ‘pregnant man’ deconstructs the distinction between ‘male’ and ‘female,’ 
challenges traditional notions of gender, and enables a person to ‘escape the dictates of biology’” 
(183).  In other words, the figure of the pregnant man makes visible the problematic way in 
which we characterize male-bodied persons as those who sire children and female-bodied 
persons as those who carry and give birth to them, and the even more problematic way in which 
we have made these characterizations essential to our interpretations of bodies, and our 
acceptance of bodies, as either male or female.   
 Taking the gender out of reproduction, in this case sp cifically pregnancy, would have 
major effects on women’s everyday lives.  First of all, there would be no more insistence on 
women having babies simply because they are women.  Women would no longer have to give 
birth in order to prove their womanliness.  In fact, most women do not know that they have the 
option of not having children, and by taking the essentialist femininity out of pregnancy, women 
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would have the option of saying no to motherhood without social sanctions and censure—there 
would be no more pressure on women to conform to a gender essentialist mandate of pregnancy, 
childbirth, and childcare.  Secondly, there would be no more pressure on women to continue an 
unwanted pregnancy, as well as no more controversy surrounding abortion care.  The 
controversy surrounding abortion has much to do with the perception that the instinct towards 
motherhood is innate in all women (for the purposes of staying on topic, I am choosing not to 
address the “right to life” argument at this point in ime).  In fact, one of the main factors in 
denying women abortions is the presumption that all women’s natural state is “mother.”  Anti-
choice legislation enforcers believe that, through the use of such tactics as waiting periods and 
forced ultrasounds, women’s supposedly natural instinct o protect their child will magically kick 
in and they will be eager to allow their child to live (to borrow the rhetoric of the anti-choice 
movement).  These biological women are not just being punished for the general act of having an 
abortion;  they are also being punished for denying, or even lacking, their "natural" maternal 
instincts.  As Maura notes in her study “The Gender of Pregnancy,” “when someone fails to do 
gender ‘correctly’ he or she is held accountable for his or her social transgressions” (122).  
Instead of committing themselves to the “natural” progression of womanmother, they are 
instead subjugating the supposed naturalness of that progression by seeking to terminate the 
pregnancy, and in the interests of preserving the illusion of the innate nurturing, maternal instinct 
of every biological woman, they are being punished for acting their gender incorrectly.   
 One of the things I have noticed recently about the conversation surrounding pregnancy 
and abortion is the overarching message that until men can get pregnant, they have no say in 
what women choose to do with their reproductive organs.  The essential point of this statement 
rings true—unless you are capable of carrying a pregnancy, you should not have a say in what 
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other people do with their unwanted pregnancies.  This essential point is much more inclusive, 
while the original statement fails to acknowledge trans* men who still have their biologically 
female reproductive organs—therefore, the assertion that “men cannot get pregnant” is clearly 
untrue.  Abortion rights are equally important for both ciswomen and trans* men, particularly 
when referencing the fact that, for many trans* men, a pregnancy could put them in serious 
physical and/or psychological danger.  Aaron, a trans* man, had this to say about his pregnancy: 
 I gave birth to my son in 2004—a son who was wanted, planned for, and loved. 
The deep love I had for my child didn't make the prgnancy an easy one, however. I am a 
transgender man.  I had not come out as transgender or b gun transitioning when I was 
pregnant, and carrying the pregnancy/giving birth was a very traumatic, difficult 
experience due to the cognitive dissonance between my mind and body. After all "men" 
can't get pregnant, right? Well, this one did…. The feelings of depression and despair 
were only endurable by focusing on the joy that would await me at the completion. (“Our 
Stories”) 
 
In Aaron’s case, while he was happy to be pregnant and excited to meet his child, the physical 
reality of his pre-transition body combined with the subsequent pregnancy and childbirth—coded 
as “female” reproductive acts—did not match the physical, emotional, mental, and psychological 
reality of his gender.  Aaron chose to keep the pregnancy because he wanted a child, but what 
about other trans* men for whom pregnancy and childbirth is physically, emotionally, and 
psychologically not an option?  While I think the intentions of abortion rights advocates are 
essentially good, I think in their rush to defend women’s right to have an abortion, they have 
forgotten that there are, in fact, men who can get pr gnant and, in turn, men who do not want to 
be pregnant.  Including trans* men in conversations about abortion rights and abortion rights 
activism is crucial, and the gender essentialism in both, whether intentional or not, needs to be 
addressed.  Anti-choice rhetoric is guilty of this same thing, although on a different level—it is 
based on the belief that men do not get pregnant, only women get pregnant, and that all women 
who get pregnant must keep the pregnancy.  They, too, fail to realize that not all women can get 
25 
pregnant, whether they are cis women or trans* women, and that some men can and do.  Another 
thing that is important to discuss is trans* men becoming pregnant pre-transition and pre-coming 
out as trans*, as in Aaron’s case.  On the outside, the pregnancy would look like a typical 
pregnancy.  However, to someone whose gender identity is he “opposite” of what one would 
expect in a pregnancy, this could be anything but typical.  We need to consider the implications 
of pregnancy from a trans* perspective, not just from a functional reproductive standpoint, but 
also from the perspective of psychological, emotional, and mental well-being.  
 
Trans* Reproduction and the Reproductive Mandate 
Judith Lorber notes in her book Paradoxes of Gender that “[a]s a process, gender creates 
the social differences that define ‘woman’ and ‘man.’  I  social interaction throughout their lives, 
individuals learn what is expected, see what is expected, act and react in expected ways, and thus 
simultaneously construct and maintain the gender order…” (60).  One of the many ways in 
which gender constructs and maintains the social differences that help maintain the gender order 
is, as Judith Butler so aptly terms it, compulsory repetition.  Butler argues in her book Undoing 
Gender that “according to its [hypostatized heterosexuality] precept, those who enter kinship 
terms as nonheterosexual will only make sense if they assume the position of mother or father” 
(123-4).  Butler then goes on to reference Sylviane Agacinski, who argues within this line of 
thinking that “‘…there is no absolute right to a child, since the right implies an increasingly 
artificial fabrication of children.  In the interests of the child, one cannot efface its double 
origin,’” (118) referring to a child’s “‘invariable beginning with a man and woman, a man who 
occupies the place of the father, and a woman who occupies the place of the mother’” (Butler 
118).  In other words, the presumed natural order of reproduction dictates that in the reproductive 
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process, there must be a mother and a father in order for the reproductive relationship to make 
sense, and speaking from a heterosexist point of view, men are the ones who father the children, 
while women are the ones who give birth.  When Butler and Agacinski talk about the 
reproduction of culture, they are specifically talking about the reproduction of who does what in 
the process of reproduction, as well as who plays what role and what that means for the 
figurative child.  Of course, when talking about men fathering children and women birthing them 
in this context, we are expressly talking about cisgender and presumably heterosexual men and 
women.  It is in this way that reproduction has, over time, become a very specifically gendered 
process, and trans* individuals problematize this presumed natural order by making it possible 
for women to be fathers and for men to be mothers.  In other words, the dictum that “men are 
fathers and women are mothers” goes right out the proverbial window.  Butler further discusses 
the French cultural belief that the child needs the signifiers of mother and father in order to 
achieve proper development and to assimilate properly into hir2 culture and society, noting that 
“[t]he belief is that culture itself requires that a man and a woman produce a child, and that the 
child have this dual point of reference for its own initiation into the symbolic order, where the 
symbolic order consists of a set of rules that order and support our sense of reality and cultural 
intelligibility” (118).  In contemplating this belief, we must recognize that it is not saying that a 
child needs the signifying figures of a mother and  father—it is saying that a child needs the 
signifying figures of a heterosexual, cisgender, feminine woman as hir mother and a 
heterosexual, cisgender, masculine man as hir father.  In that regard, one must wonder what 
proponents of this belief think will happen when one’s biological father identifies as a woman 
and/or one’s biological mother identifies as a man.  Wittig notes that “by its very existence, 
                                                
2 I am choosing to use gender-neutral terminology here and throughout this paper when 
applicable. 
27 
lesbian society destroys the artificial (social) fact constituting women as a ‘natural’ group” (103).  
Is it not possible, then, that by their very existenc , trans* parents destroy the artificial (social) 
fact constituting fathers and mothers as natural, specifically gendered groups, as well?  When we 
start looking at the issue of the right to have children, trans* reproductive rights become not just 
a gender issue, and not even just a biology issue, but also a human rights issue.   
Gayle Rubin, in her essay “Thinking Sex,” discusses how “[m]odern Western societies 
praise sex acts according to a hierarchical system of sexual value….Individuals whose behavior 
stands high in this hierarchy are rewarded with certifi d mental health, respectability, legality, 
social and physical mobility, institutional support, and material benefits” (279).  In other words, 
certain sex acts, such as reproductive sex between married couples, are given more social and 
cultural value than others, which results in better social standing for those who commit the sex 
acts that society deems most valuable.  According to Rubin’s conception of the sexual hierarchy, 
“good” sex is considered to be heterosexual, cisgender, and reproductive, while trans* 
individuals are at the bottom of said hierarchy (282).  A similar hierarchy exists for reproduction, 
where society praises certain reproductive acts according to a similar system of reproductive 
value.  Society’s reproductive mandate simply state that everyone must reproduce;   what is not 
mentioned, however, is that in order for the reproductive act to carry any social weight, the 
participants must be married (preferably), heterosexual, cisgender, and conventionally masculine 
or feminine if they are a man or a woman, respectivly.  Trans* individuals who choose to 
reproduce using their biological reproductive organs re a living paradox for the 
sexual/reproductive hierarchy, in that they are fulfilling the reproductive mandate (and 
participating in “good” sex by reproducing), but they are not the cisgender participants that 
society requires in order for the reproductive act to be seen as legitimate and socially valuable.  
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Society does not know whether to praise them for rep oducing (and thereby following society’s 
mandate) or censure them for being the “wrong” people to engage in reproduction. 
In American society, trans* people are often only accepted (if they are accepted at all) as 
long as they promise to occupy (hetero)normative gender roles.  In his essay “Normalized 
Transgressions: Legitimizing the Transsexual Body as Productive,” Dan Irving explores how 
assimilatory politics play a role in the framing of legitimate transgender/transsexual bodies (15) 
and argues that there is an “imperative to be ‘prope ’ in the eyes of the state” (23).  He goes on to 
argue that “the valorization of the maleness or femal ness of post-transition transsexuals hinged 
in part on understandings of their productive capacity….The real-life test was administered by 
GICs [Gender Identity Clinics] to monitor the ability of the transsexual patient to live entirely as 
a demonstrable member of the opposite sex” (Irving 20).  For trans* people, this often (if not 
always) means giving up their ability to reproduce, since in order for their gender to be 
considered “legitimate,” they would have to give up their reproductive organs, which are strictly 
gendered.  Irving goes on to note that “only a particular transsexual narrative – one that 
subscribes to hegemonic and heteronormative categories f sex/gender – will be accepted as a 
reflection of genuine transsexualism” (20).  While it is true that many trans* individuals would 
prefer to have a full operation so that their bodies will match their gender, it is equally true that 
other trans* individuals would want to keep their functioning reproductive organs, viewing them 
from a purely functional standpoint, so that they would be able to have biological children in the 
future.  Why is it that trans* individuals who desire biological children must give up an explicitly 
wanted working reproductive body in exchange for gender authenticity?  In answering this 
question, I return to the concept of fertility acting as proof of gender authenticity—in reality, this 
only applies to cisgender people.  For trans* individuals, the opposite is true—the only proof of 
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gender authenticity is sterility.  Sterility in cisgender individuals, whether chosen or not, is seen 
as a tragedy because society’s reproductive mandate states that they are the “right people” to 
engage in the process of reproduction, but it does n t weigh in on their gender authenticity—we 
do not require infertile cisgender people to undergo fertility treatments in order to consider their 
gender legitimate.  However, for trans* individuals, there is an unspoken edict that in order for 
their gender to be accepted as legitimate, they must give up their right to reproduce using their 
original reproductive organs.  This is because cisgender people are considered to be doing gender 
correctly and therefore do not need to prove the legitimacy of their gender.  Society does not 
consider transgender people to be doing gender correctly, so it asks them to go to extreme 
measures to prove their gender authenticity.  This is one example of the social sanctions against 
perceived gender noncompliance that Maura Ryan discusses in her study (122), which I 
mentioned in my first chapter.  Because society sees trans* individuals as doing gender 
incorrectly, they are summarily punished.  From both a gender and human rights perspective, this 
is unacceptable—removal of reproductive organs and elimination of fertility should be a choice, 
not a requirement in order to be seen as authentically m le or female.   
When we think about the reproduction of gender, gender orms, and heteronormative 
behaviors, we have to ask ourselves why the fertility/infertility requirement exists.  In the past, 
“[d]octors who opposed any medical intervention enabli g one to change sex did so in part 
because they believed that this transition would thwart the…(re)productive potential of the 
(presumed) female” (Irving 19).  Irving then cites he 1950s sexologist David O. Cauldwell, who 
argued that “it would be criminal of a doctor to remove healthy organs” (“Questions and 
Answers on the Sex Life and Sexual Problems of Transsexuals”) whereby “[t]he criminal nature 
of the surgical act is rooted in Cauldwell’s belief that to operate on the transsexual body is to 
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destroy its capacity for a (hetero)sexual life by thwarting the individual’s reproductive potential” 
(“Questions and Answers on the Sex Life and Sexual Problems of Transsexuals”).  Here, we can 
clearly see how sexuality (particularly heterosexuality) and biological capacity for reproduction 
are closely linked, as well as how the refusal to operate on a transsexual/transgender body lies in 
the belief that a heterosexual, reproductive life is the norm and should be preserved by any 
means necessary.  Nowadays, while many doctors are willing to operate on trans* individuals’ 
bodies, the preservation of a working reproductive body is seen as abnormal in the context of 
transition.  Judith Butler cites the example of David Reimer, who was born biologically male but 
whose “penis was accidentally burned and severed in the course of a surgical operation” (59).  
Butler notes that David went through  
two transsexual surgeries:  the first based on a hypot etical argument about what  
gender should be, given the ablated nature of the penis;  the second based on what  
the gender should be, based on the behavioral and verbal indications of the person  
in question.  In both cases, certain inferences are made, ones that suggest that a  
body must be a certain way for a gender to work, another which says that a body  
must feel a certain way for a gender to work. (71) 
 
In the first surgery, because David’s penis had been injured so extremely, it was decided that he 
should live as a girl because, without a working penis, he could not be a man.  In the second 
surgery, it was David’s insistence that he was a man th t allowed him the opportunity to 
“become” a man again.  For those who are transitioning from male to female, or vice versa, they 
may not necessarily want to give up a working reproductive body in order for their gender to be 
seen as authentic.  However, because biology and geer are so intricately linked in our society, 
there is a strict assertion that in order to be a woman or a man, you must have certain body parts, 
so many trans* individuals might feel that having all possible surgeries is necessary.  Separating 
gender from reproduction will extend trans* individuals’ freedom to reproduce biologically 
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related children, should they desire them, by taking away the feeling that it is absolutely 
necessary to remove one’s reproductive organs in order to be considered a man or woman.   
Irving further argues in his essay “Normalized Transgressions,” “[t]hat the organization 
of (re)production wields a significant influence on the social construction of sex and gender is a 
rudimentary point of feminist political economy.  The construction of transsexual identities vis-
à-vis capitalist productive relations serves to enrich our understanding of the ways that 
sex/gender are constructed as regulatory regimes” (17).  It is a well-known concept that sex and 
gender are social constructs that act as regulatory factors in our lives, and the issue of 
reproductive organs being used for a purely functioal purpose highlights this very clearly.  
When arguing the issue of trans* individuals using their reproductive organs from a purely 
functional perspective, rather than seeing those organs as signifiers of a specific gender/gender 
identity, we need to remember that there are plenty of cisgender individuals who also use their 
reproductive organs for a purely functional purpose—r production, whether it is through sexual 
intercourse, in-vitro fertilization (IVF), where the egg is fertilized outside of the womb and the 
resulting embryo is implanted into the uterus, or int a-uterine insemination (IUI), where the 
sperm is collected from the father and inserted into the uterus via a medical procedure.  The 
gender identities of those cisgender individuals, to my knowledge, are not called into question.  
The only time that the functional use of reproductive organs becomes an issue from a gendered 
perspective is when trans* individuals attempt to do so, at which point the gendered nature of 
reproductive organs and processes suddenly becomes highly visible.  We need to ask ourselves 
why it is so easy to ignore gender when it comes to the reproductive organs and processes of 
cisgender individuals, but not when it comes to those f trans* individuals.  Of course, looking at 
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reproductive organs and reproduction itself as purely functional is not all that romantic, but it is 
practical, and certainly more inclusive, from a gend red perspective than the alternative.  
Now, of course, we must also take into consideration what to do with the terminology 
when it comes to trans* individuals who have chosen to use their biological reproductive organs 
in order to reproduce.  Up until this point, the assumption has been that if you are a man who 
reproduces, you are a father, and if you are a woman who reproduces, you are a mother.  Does 
this labeling depend on the gender identity of the person involved in the reproduction of these 
children, or on the biological reproductive process which they are undergoing?  If the former is 
true, then logic states that a trans* man who gives birth to his children, even though he is using 
what has traditionally been a “woman’s” reproductive organs, will still be considered a father, 
and a trans* woman who produces children using what has traditionally been a “man’s” 
reproductive organs will still be considered a mother.  However, if the latter is true, then logic 
states that a trans* man who gives birth will be considered a mother, and a trans* woman who 
sires children will be considered a father.  In Thomas Beatie’s case, in a 2012 interview with 
Oprah Winfrey, he stated that “I don’t see myself as both a mother and a father—I see myself as 
a father who gave birth” (“The Pregnant Man’s Life Today”).  In this regard, Beatie does not 
view his ovaries, his uterus, his pregnancies, or the subsequent births of his children as being 
essentially female and resulting in motherhood;  rather, he views them as simply another means 
of achieving fatherhood.  It is interesting to note that he went on to have surgery to create a penis 
after the births of his children, so there was clearly  desire to have his physical body match his 
gender identity at some point, but the fact of the matter is that his reproductive organs in and of 
themselves, while they have been coded “female,” acted purely in a functional reproductive 
standpoint, as opposed to a functional and gendered reproductive standpoint.  He went on to say 
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that “Susan, Austin, and Jensen [his children] call me Daddy, and that is my name.  I’m not 
Thomas anymore, I’m Daddy,” (Winfrey) and towards the end of the interview, he states that 
“Through all of this I have determined that’s my meaning and purpose in life, is to usher these 
human beings into this world and make sure I’m always there for them” (Winfrey).  What is 
fascinating about his assessment of his identity as a f ther is that it is all-consuming, which many 
would likely point out as being a stereotypically female way of viewing parenthood.  In Beatie’s 
case, he acknowledges that, after becoming a father, he is no longer Thomas, but Daddy—his 
identity as a father has superseded all else.  He takes that one step further in his declaration that 
the birth of his children is his raison d’être, whic  demonstrates his clear devotion to his 
children.  However, this also plays into an extremely conservative model of family that erases all 
agency for the parent, in which the person’s children and their relationship to their children 
replaces the rest of the parent’s identity.  In that regard, while it appears that Thomas Beatie’s 
identity as a trans* man does not necessarily destroy the artificial creation of “mother” and 
“father” or the changes that come with those labels, it does complicate the two in that it 
demonstrates clearly that it is not only cisgender individuals who take on the parenting role.  
Trans* individuals do so, as well, and they are equally capable of being dedicated to their 
children.  Of course, there is another option that we can consider—simply referring to a parent as 
a parent.  The words “mother” and “father” have specifically gendered connotations, and if our 
ultimate goal is to take the gender out of reproduction, then would it not make the most sense to 
take the gender out of parenthood, as well?  Perhaps this would only make sense if we insisted 
on attaching the words “mother” and “father” to gend r.  What if we were to look at the words 
from a social perspective?  As Judith Butler argues, while it is physically necessary for an egg 
and a sperm to meet in order for another human being to be produced, “are sperm donors or one-
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night stands, or indeed, rapists, really fathers in a ‘social’ sense” (10)?  In other words, 
committing the physical act of reproduction does not necessarily make one a parent—it is the 
physical presence and emotional involvement that makes one a parent, and you do not have to be 
cisgender in order to be physically present and emotionally involved with your child.  If we were 
to look at the roles of mother and father in this way, it creates a more inclusive definition of the 
two words.  In other words, rather than arguing that a mother is simply a woman who gives birth 
and that a father is simply a man who sires a child, we could instead argue that a mother is 
someone who identifies as a woman who takes care of a child and a father is someone who 
identifies as a man who does the same.  We have already established that definition when it 
comes to adoptive parents (often putting the distinctio  “adoptive” in front of the word mother or 
father), so why can we not do the same when it comes to parents who happen to be trans*?  
 Ultimately, when it comes to trans* individuals rep oducing using their biological 
reproductive organs, society sees that action as a thre t to its stability and its carefully crafted 
sex/gender/reproductive hierarchy.  They see this as a threat because trans* fathers who give 
birth to their own children and trans* mothers who inseminate their partners complicate the 
supposedly natural order of man = father and woman = mother.  The process of reproduction 
does not just produce more human beings—it also helps r produce the sex/gender binary.  From 
the moment we are born, from the moment we are placed in that blue or pink blanket (depending 
on our genitalia), we are socialized into performing gender in a certain way.  As Judith Lorber 
notes in her essay “The Social Construction of Gender,” “[gender inequality] is produced and 
maintained by identifiable social processes and built into the general social structure and 
individual identities deliberately and purposefully….The paradox of human nature is that it is 
always a manifestation of cultural meanings, social relationships, and power politics” (101).  
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Society continually attempts to convince us that the sex/gender binary is the result of a natural 
impetus of males towards masculinity and of females towards femininity, but we know that this 
is not the case.  If it really were the result of natural forces, then it would not be necessary for 
“[p]olitical power, control of scarce resources, and, if necessary, violence [to] uphold the 
gendered social order in the face of resistance and rebellion” (Lorber 101).  Trans* reproduction 
is absolutely an act of rebellion against the sex/gnder binary, which dictates not only that men 
and women occupy different reproductive roles in society, but also that these roles can never 
change and that men and women can never switch these roles.  Lorber notes that  
Gender is so pervasive that in our society we assume it is bred into our genes.   
Most people find it hard to believe that gender is constantly created and re-created  
out of human interaction, out of social life, and is the texture and order of that  
social life.  Yet gender, like culture, is a human production that depends on  
everyone constantly ‘doing gender.’ (101) 
 
Society depends on men and women occupying the gender roles that have been assigned to them, 
and it also depends on everyone accepting its “naturalness” as a given, despite the social 
sanctions and manipulations that are necessary to continually reproduce this naturalness.  Trans* 
individuals who choose to reproduce using their biological reproductive organs force us to 
question the authenticity of natural gender roles, as well as the naturalness of the sex/gender 
binary itself, by proving that one does not necessarily have to be a woman in order to give birth, 
nor does one necessarily have to be a man in order to father children.  The norm of cisgender 
women giving birth and cisgender men fathering children helps reproduce the norm that women 
are naturally feminine, passive, and nurturing, while men are naturally masculine and 
authoritative, and that is the crux of why trans* individuals who choose to keep their biological 
reproductive organs and have children using those organs are vilified by society—because they 
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prove that society’s beliefs about sex and gender and their relationship to reproduction are 
wrong.   
 
Conclusion 
Throughout this paper, I have explored the existing social and cultural beliefs 
surrounding biology, gender, and reproduction, and I find that they are rabidly hetero- and 
cissexist.  For everyone, but especially for those f us who have chosen not to reproduce and for 
those who have chosen to reproduce outside of the hetero- and cissexual norm, our ability and 
desire (or lack thereof) to reproduce being artificially tied to our gender identity (and vice versa) 
creates a violent ideology that is inherently sexist and transphobic.  Even though society’s 
reproductive mandate, at least on paper, simply dictates that everyone must reproduce, in a more 
subtle and sinister manner, it also dictates that only certain people with certain bodies, gender 
identities, and modes of reproduction are normal, and those of us who want to exist outside the 
norm have to go to excessive measures in order to be considered legitimate.  For many trans* 
individuals, that means giving up an explicitly wanted functional reproductive body in exchange 
for socially recognized gender authenticity.  This is deplorable from a gender equality, 
reproductive rights, and human rights perspective, and it is for this reason that it is imperative 
that we re-examine and redefine the relationships between biology, gender, and reproduction.  
Considering the number of individuals who identify as trans* and the likelihood that 
these individuals will reproduce, it seems that the “natural” order of man as father and woman as 
mother will shortly be coming to an end.  However, in order to achieve that goal, we must 
deconstruct these harmful connections between sex, gender, and reproduction.  We must also ask 
many “who, what, when, where, why, and how” type qustions:  why do these connections exist?  
37 
Whom do these connections benefit, and whom do they harm?  What can be done to complicate 
these connections and interrupt their supposedly natural and normal existence?  This paper seeks 
to attempt to answer some of those questions, although it has far from answered all of them.  It is 
relatively simple to answer the first question and, i  answering it, I also answer the second—
these connections between sex, gender, and reproducti n exist because they benefit those whose 
bodies conform to society’s expectations and because they directly and indirectly harm those 
whose bodies do not fit into the socially constructed gender binary.  The last question, 
unfortunately, is a little harder to answer.  Some would argue that increased visibility of 
LGBTQ+ pregnancies and families could help in this regard, and it might.  However, we need to 
avoid perpetuating a heteronormative standard of family structure—not all families have two 
parents, for example.  Some families have only one par nt, or multiple parents. Instead of 
promoting only two-parent families in our quest for visibility, we need to show families of all 
kinds—along with the usual image of a gay or lesbian couple adopting children, we also need to 
show single trans* men having children through artificial insemination with the intention of 
being a single parent, poly* families of all sexual orientations and genders raising their children 
all together, a couple made up of a cisgender man and a trans* woman adopting children, just to 
name a few.  We need to show that there is no single definition of what makes a family, and in 
turn show that there is no single definition of what makes a parent.  
One of the shortcomings of this paper is that it is purely theoretical—unfortunately, I fell 
out of contact with my friend Natalie, who is a trans* woman and who inspired me to write this 
paper in the first place, shortly after I began writing.  I would have loved to have her perspective 
on this issue, since she is co-parenting her biological child from a previous relationship (when 
she was still presenting as male) with her current cisgender female partner and, when I last spoke 
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to her, was planning to inseminate her partner “theold fashioned way,” as she put it, in order to 
have another biological child.  I would have also liked to get in contact with Thomas Beatie 
himself and ask him a few questions concerning his thoughts on transgender reproduction, since 
he continues to be a public figure on the subject.  My thoughts and theories on this subject can 
only do so much, and I hope that someone will be inspired by my work to take it one step further 
and conduct a sociological study of trans* individuals who have chosen to reproduce using their 
biological reproductive organs that further explores the connections between biological sex and 
gender identity and how they relate to reproduction and the choices related to it.  
 Our society’s reproductive mandate is harmful to everyone in that it forces individuals 
who may or may not want to reproduce to do so anyway.  However, there is a specific harm done 
to those whose bodies, genders, and reproductive choices do not fit into the binary that society 
insists is normal and natural.  The reproductive mandate clearly focuses on heterosexual couples 
made up of one cisgender, conventionally masculine man and one cisgender, conventionally 
feminine woman, and society depends on the repetition of this reproductive pairing in order to 
prove to society’s members (and possibly even itself) that this is the natural order of things.  Any 
reproductive act that occurs outside of this is deem d abnormal and suspect because it interrupts 
and complicates the message that society is attempting to convey and gives real-life examples 
proving that the natural order of things is kept in place through very unnatural means—social 
sanctions, censure, and violence.  Trans* individuals who choose to reproduce using the 
reproductive organs with which they were born summarily destroy the belief that only women 
can give birth and only men can father children, thereby destroying the image of the natural 
order of gender in relationship to biology and reproduction.  Forcing trans* individuals to give 
up a wanted functional reproductive body in exchange for gender authenticity is punishment for 
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daring to question the perceived sex/gender binary in elationship to reproduction and a feeble 
attempt to preserve the naturalness of said binary.  If we were to start viewing reproductive 
organs from a purely functional perspective instead of as proof of gender authenticity, it would 
be much more inclusive from both a gender and reproductive standpoint.  It is entirely possible 
that it would also help erode the sex/gender binary and expand the relationship between 
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